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ANTI-PAPARAZZI LEGISLATION
Since the death of Princess Diaha, virtually everyone has joined
in the hue and cry against the paparazzi. As part of this uproar,
Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.)
have introduced legislation intended to fight overly enthusiastic
paparazzi who stalk celebrities and seek out those involved in
scandal.' Senate Bill 2103 would make it a federal crime to at-
tempt to photograph or record a person in a way that risks bodily
harm. It would also make the use of a telephoto lens to take
photographs of a subject inside her apartment cognizable as a
tort.2 While superficially attractive, the Feinstein-Hatch proposal
contributes to an impulse to demonize the media that ultimately
compromises the civic-republican notion of an informed, self-
governing public. Further, the proposal affords the rich and fa-
mous scant more protection than state tort law, which, contrary
to celebrity rhetoric, adequately protects Americans from these
''parasites."
The fact that the unlikely team of Hatch and Feinstein are cham-
pioning this legislation indicates that the bill goes beyond parti-
san politics. The paparazzi are easy to hate. They are poorly be-
haved, and even despicable in their total disregard for the pri-
vacy of their subjects. In 1972, Ronald Galella, a photographer,
was tried for stalking Jackie Onassis and her children. He jumped
out of bushes in Central Park, hid in a coat rack at a Chinese
restaurant, nearly knocked the Onassis children off their bicycles
in an effort to snap a photo of John Kennedy, Jr., and bribed a
classmate of John Jr.'s to take pictures of the family at a school
pageant.' The judge had little patience with this paparazzo,
whom he described as a pest and a "gadfly. ' '4 Galella was found
'See Personal Privacy Protection Act, S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998); 144 Cong. Rec.
S5462 (daily ed. May 22, 1998) (statements of Sen. Hatch). The bill is currently stalled
in the Senate. See also Todd S. Purdum, Two Senators Propose Anti-Paparazzi Law,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1998, at A16. Tom Hayden, a California state senator, recently
pushed a similar bill through the California legislature. See generally Christian Berthel-
sen, California Law Will Allow Celebrities to Sue Paparazzi, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1998,
at ClI; Gayle Fee & Laura Raposa, Whiny Stars Get Anti-Paparazzi Bill Passed in a
Snap, BosToN HERALD, Oct. 13, 1998, at 8.2 See S. 2103.
3 See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 207-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). More recently, two photographers were con-
victed of pursuing Arnold Schwarzenegger and his wife Maria Shriver shortly after
Schwarzenegger received heart surgery. See Photographers Jailed for Pursuit, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at B4.
4 Galella, 487 F. 2d at 991-92.
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guilty of an array of offenses including harassment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and invasion
of privacy.5
This sort of unprincipled behavior lends any act punishing the
paparazzi a popular appeal. Before enacting this legislation,
however, it is critical to recognize the ideological costs involved.
The right to privacy, the central principle upon on which this act
is based, reflects a liberal-individualist emphasis on autonomy
and freedom from both government and public scrutiny. The
First Amendment, on the other hand, embodies the civic-
republican conviction that in a democratic polity, freedom,
defined as the right to govern oneself, depends on an informed
public.6 The Anti-Paparazzi Act is just one example of the inher-
ent tension between the right to privacy and the First Amend-
ment guarantee of a free press. While it is important to balance
these two forms of liberty, the Feins'tein-Hatch bill threatens to
overwhelm the civic value of informed political participation
with a liberal-individualist emphasis on personal privacy.
Historians have argued that, at the turn of the century, the re-
publican values of civic virtue, independence, and informed par-
ticipation in the public arena gave way to new ideas about indi-
viduality and personality. The focus on self-government was
displaced by a Lockean notion of individual pursuit of happiness
and freedom from governmental interference. The concept of the
public good was replaced by a new emphasis on self-fulfillment
and self-realization. 7 It was during this period that Louis Bran-
deis and Samuel Warren conceptualized the right to privacy. In
1890, they wrote, "[t]he press is overstepping in every direction
the obvious bounds of propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer
the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery."' The
5 See id. at 994.
6See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. Rav. 255, 263 (1992)
("[the First Amendment is fundamentally aimed at protecting democratic self-
government"); Owen Fiss, Why the State, 100 HARN. L. Rav. 781 (1987) (arguing that
the First Amendment protects collective self-determination). Recently scholars have
used civic republicanism to argue that free speech should be limited. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540-42 (1988).
7 See, e.g., T.J. JACKSON LEARS, No PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880-1920 3-59 (1994); WARREN I. SOS-
MAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
271-87 (1984).
8 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193, 195 (1890).
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authors argued that older forms of social ostracization and com-
munity condemnation would no longer suffice. The law itself
had to protect what Warren and Brandeis referred to as "public
morality" and the "inviolate personality."9 The Supreme Court
has since recognized a constitutional right to privacy, and the
sharp distinction between the public and the private realm con-
tinues to play an important role in twentieth-century American
legal and political discourse. 0 It is important, however, to bal-
ance this right to privacy with the persistent value of civic re-
publicanism by preserving the potency of the freedom of the
press clause of the First Amendment.
Last year, the late Congressman Sonny Bono (R-Cal.) intro-
duced legislation similar to the Feinstein-Hatch bill." In pro-
moting House Bill 2448, Bono made a gesture toward freedom
of the press, but quickly added that "it is without doubt that the
activities of the bounty-hunting paparazzi go beyond the robust
public discourse envisioned by the Founders."'1 2 At the Congres-
sional hearings for the Feinstein-Hatch bill, actor Paul Reiser
similarly rejected the notion that the paparazzi should be af-
forded First Amendment protection. Reiser echoed the late-
nineteenth-century concern for lost morals, giving moving testi-
mony about the ruthless coverage of his son's premature birth
and concluding that "[t]he code of civility and common decency
we all aspire to seems to be vanishing."' 3
Despite the conviction of these celebrities, it is impossible to
draw the line between valid news reporters and paparazzi. In
1798, James Madison argued that "some degree of abuse is in-
separable from the proper use of everything, and in no instance
is this more true than in the press."'1 4 As editor and reporter Paul
McMasters commented in his testimony at the congressional
hearings:
9 See id. at 210-11.
'0 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
" See Protection From Personal Intrusion Act of 1997, H.R. 2448, 105th Cong.
12 143 CONG. REc. E1709-01 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1997) (Statement of Rep. Bono).
This testimony echoed sentiments of former President Nixon, who during Watergate,
excoriated the press for its unscrupulous behavior. See THEODORE WHITE, BREACH OF
FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 154 (1975).
'3 Privacy Protection: Hearings on H.R. 3224 Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Paul Reiser).
144 ELLIOT'S DEBATE ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876), cited in New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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News photography has the capacity to chill our senses,
inflame our passions, awaken us to the need for action, con-
nect us to our own communities, to inform us, and to enter-
tain us. It is possible for good writers to tell credible stories
from a distance, but photographers must be there, must have
access to the people and events that make the news."5
In our culture, the line between the paparazzi and legitimate news
photographers is not easy to draw. If we abolish one, we might
destroy the other.
Further, in the current economy, serious freelance photogra-
phers often rely on revenue from celebrity photographs to sup-
port their more political and intellectual work. For example,
shortly after Princess Diana's death, The New York Times pub-
lished a confession of a freelance photographer to his bereaved
and outraged mother. The photographer wrote, "I couldn't tell
her that the story on homeless drug addicts I worked on for a
year earned me a tenth of what the photos of Jackie O.'s funeral
did, nor that the three months' work in Russia I did in 1991
earned less than the few frames I took of John Jr."16
It is thus critical to balance the profound ideological costs of
this legislation with the benefits the Act would purportedly pro-
vide. Feinstein and Hatch fashioned a modest bill to increase the
chances that it would pass constitutional muster. In its current
form, however, the bill does not offer much greater protection
than state tort law. 17
In their seminal article The Right to Privacy, Brandeis and
Warren conceptualized the tort of invasion of privacy and
defined privacy as the "right to be let alone." is They asserted that
this fundamental human right was increasingly threatened by
technology and the press: "Instantaneous photographs and news-
paper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet
1 Privacy Protection: Hearings on H.R. 3224 Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Paul K. McMasters, president of the Society of
Professional Journalists). For a similar argument about the power of photographs in
American history, see VicKi GOLDBERG, THE POWER OF PHOTOGRAPHY: How PHOTO-
GRAPHS CHANGED OUR LivEs 7-8 (1991).
16 Porter Gifford, Mom, I'm Not a Paparazzo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at A23.
17 Opponents of the bill, including the American Civil Liberties Union, claim that the
behavior it is designed to punish is already covered by existing state law. Senator Fein-
stein, however, argues that state laws are inconsistent and uneven. See Purdum, supra
note 1.
18 Brandeis and Warren, supra note 8, at 195.
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shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."'19 William L. Prosser
more broadly defined the invasion of privacy as the intrusion
upon seclusion or solitude, public disclosure of private facts,
publicity which places the plaintiff in false light, or the appro-
priation of name or likeness.20 The Restatement of Torts has
adopted Prosser's definition of invasion of privacy, and most ju-
risdictions have integrated some version of this definition into
their common law.21
The tort of invasion of privacy, recognized in some form by all
but ten states, can adequately protect the victims of the papa-
razzi.2 When a photographer takes a picture in a place in which
the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts gener-
ally find that the photographer has intruded on the plaintiff's pri-
vacy.23 Following this rationale, the Ninth Circuit held that
magazine reporters invaded a healer's privacy when they gained
entrance to her house by lying, photographed her, and used a
hidden radio transmitter to record the conversation.24 Another
court held that a news picture syndicate was guilty of invasion of
privacy for taking a photograph of a patient in her hospital bed
when the only newsworthy quality about the patient was her
obesity.25 The Fifth Circuit similarly affirmed an award of
$150,000 against Hustler magazine for publishing a stolen pho-
tograph depicting the plaintiff in the nude.26
In his congressional testimony, Professor Lawrence Lessig
contended that it is important to extend our legal conceptions to
cover offenses made possible by modem technology. Therefore,
Lessig argued that the bill's "expansion" of trespass doctrine to
include photographs taken with a telephoto lens was desirable.27
191d.
2 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. Rav. 383, 389 (1960).
21 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (1977).
2 Colorado, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Washington have avoided recognizing
or rejecting the right to privacy. Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have refused to
recognize the right, while Maine, Vermont, and Wyoming have not addressed the issue.
The remaining states have recognized some statutory or common law right to privacy.
Id.
23 See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Taking Unauthorized Photographs as Invasion
of Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3d 374 (1998). Notably, there is no indication that the proposed
legislation would change the rule of New York 7imes v. Sullivan, and celebrities would
still have to prove "actual malice" to recover on "false light privacy" claims. See Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
24 See A.A. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (interpreting Cali-
fornia law).
2 See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199 (1942).
2 See Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1984).
27 Privacy Protection: Hearings on H.R. 3224 Before the House Comm. on the Judici.
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Lessig's argument, however, ignores the fact that the tort of in-
vasion of privacy already includes non-physical invasions made
possible by modem technology.8 Thus, the Louisiana Court of
Appeals has held that a police officer who looked through a sus-
pect's bedroom window and took pictures with a telescopic lens
had invaded the plaintiffs privacy.29
The common law right to privacy does not protect individuals
when they are in public view, but the torts of intentional
infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery can war-
rant recovery for behavior that is particularly egregious, even if
the photographer only pursued the subject in public places. For
example, in one case, a court acquitted a photographer who had
harassed a cruise ship passenger of invasion of privacy because
the harassment did not occur in an area of private seclusion, but
nevertheless still held that the photographer's conduct consti-
tuted intentional infliction of emotional distress. 0 When Galella
was tried in the case discussed above, New York law did not ex-
plicitly recognize a common law right to privacy; it did, how-
ever, have an harassment statute that made it a crime to follow a
person into a public place, initiate physical contact, or engage in
annoying conduct with the intent to harass. New York law also
recognized a freedom from emotional distress that was used lib-
erally to protect privacy interests.31 It was these state laws, com-
mon in some form to every state, that protected the Kennedys
from paparazzi.
Courts and academics continue to debate whether the consti-
tutional guarantee of freedom of the press offers any special
privileges to the news media, or whether it is simply subsumed
under the category of free speech. Although this dilemma has
not been resolved, most courts do not allow members of the
ary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Harvard Law School profes-
sor).
2s The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines this intrusion as "[o]ne who intention-
ally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability ... for invasion of his privacy, if...
offensive to a reasonable person." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
29See Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So.2d 716 (La. App. 1956). Similarly,
courts have held that wire tapping can constitute an invasion of personal privacy. See,
e.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225 (1931) (holding it was an invasion of privacy to
listen to plaintiffs telephone conversations by using a wire tap); Hamberger v. East-
man, 106 N.H. 107 (1964) (holding a landlord invaded his tenants' privacy when he
installed a listening and recording device in their bedroom).
30 See Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482 (D. Me. 1987), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1988).
31 See Galella, 487 F.2d at 994-95.
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press any special privileges based on their role as newsgather-
ers.32 At most, courts weigh the interests of public access to the
information with the privacy and property interests of the alleged
victim.3 3 Therefore, a photographer or journalist would not be
immune from civil or criminal prosecution simply because she
committed the wrongful act in pursuit of a story.
When the interest of the public is minimal, courts do not
hesitate to use state law to convict the press for illegal conduct.
After a scathing criticism of the photographer who stalked Jackie
Onassis and her family, the Galella Court concluded that the
First Amendment "does not immunize all conduct designed to
gather information about or photographs of a public figure," and
added, "there is no constitutional right to assault, harass, or un-
ceasingly shadow or distress public figures."'
Senator Feinstein is right that states are not completely con-
sistent in their application of laws against overly-aggressive me-
dia. State common law rules of trespass, invasion of privacy,
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and as-
sault and battery, however, cover most unseemly behavior, and
no court grants the press immunity based on the First Amend-
ment protection of the press. Overall, the paparazzi whom this
legislation is aimed at could likely be held liable or guilty under
current state law.
The Feinstein-Hatch bill does not substantively change state
tort and/or criminal law. The legislation does, however, serve
another purpose. It allows these senators, and the government
itself, to stand squarely against the inappropriate longing to pry
into the lives of the Hollywood and political elite. As the public
32 See David F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering on Pri-
vate Property, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1298, 1299 (1984); see also LEONARD W. LEVY,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRES-
SION (1960). The Supreme Court has held "generally applicable laws do not offend the
First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663, 670 (1991). Following this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit has similarly asserted
that the first amendment does not exempt the media from torts or crimes committed
while gathering news. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. Lower courts frequently offer a
similar rationale. See Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1492 (1986); see also
Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1418 (E.D. Pa. 1996).33 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 32, at 1307-12; Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher,
340 So.2d 914 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1976); Miller, 187 Cal. App. at 1463 (holding NBC liable
for trespass when a news crew entered a woman's home without her consent to film the
paramedics' rescue attempt.); Dietmann, 449 F.2d at 249 ("First Amendment is not a
license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means in the precincts of an-
other's home or office."); Galella, 353 F. Supp. at 223-24.
3 Galella, 353 F. Supp. at 223.
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is learning more and more about the indiscretions on Capitol
Hill, this legislation would allow the government to assume a
dignified pose while playing into the public's desire to transfer
blame to the indiscreet media.
The public response to the O.J. Simpson case, Princess Di-
ana's death, and President Clinton's sexual affairs illustrates the
fact that the media serves as a perfect scapegoat. The media
gives us someone to blame, not only for tragedies like Princess
Diana's untimely death, but also for our own voyeuristic and
prurient interests. The Anti-Paparazzi Act would allow us to
transfer blame for these recent events to the media while exoner-
ating ourselves from our own ceaseless curiosity. Rather than
face the shame that accompanies our fascination with O.J.'s ex-
cesses, Diana's final date, and President Clinton's indiscretions,
we blame the messenger.
The Monica Lewinsky scandal is an example of the profound
ambivalence Americans have toward gossip. This social and
cultural confusion gives meaning to the debate over freedom of
speech and rights to privacy. Americans in general are disgusted
by the media coverage of Clinton's affair. President Clinton's
approval ratings, however, remain stable while the media bears
the blame for the melodrama. Warren and Brandeis wrote that
"[s]upply creates the demand" which results in "a lowering of
social standard and of morality." 35 The moral and economic uni-
verse, however, works in the opposite direction. It is the public
who buys the papers, watches the news, and turns the channel to
get the latest developments. While Americans want the gossip,
however, they yearn for a time when we kept secrets to ourselves
and the President's semen was not a proper topic at a cocktail
party. The proposed anti-paparazzi law functions as a public,
national condemnation of the press. By blaming the media, we
get to have it both ways. We will still hear stories about Ms.
Lewinsky, and we will still see pictures of Princess Diana and
Arnold Schwarzenegger, but we can look at them in horror, with
a sense of moral superiority rather than having to admit our base
desire see into the private lives of public figures.
Photographers can be insensitive and intrusive, but celebrity
itself is created and perpetuated by this same media. Tom Cruise
has dedicated himself to a public mission of criminalizing pho-
35 Warren and Brandeis, supra note 8, at 196.
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tographers who follow him and his family as they try to lead a
"normal life. 36 While it is possible to feel sympathetic for Mr.
Cruise in his somewhat disingenuous pursuit of privacy, these
same "gadflies" have helped Cruise capitalize on his boy-next-
door good looks to sell movie tickets. Actors like Cruise too
easily assume that they can and should be able to benefit from
the media while controlling it at the same time.
The effort to impose a code of ethics on the media will neces-
sarily fail unless we allow the interests of privacy to obscure our
First Amendment rights. It is possible that no critical news
would be lost if we outlawed chasing celebrities to take pictures
for tabloid papers. The distinction, however, between valid and
essential newsgatherers and gossip hunters is not always so
clear. The press infuriates figures like Richard Nixon, Paul
Reiser, and Tom Cruise because it refuses to be controlled, but
this refusal to submit is also the source of its power. Public
figures will continue to paint the press as evil and mercenary, but
until history unfolds, it can be hard to tell a paparazzo from an
investigative news journalist. In order to inform the public, the
press needs to be able to behave in a way that is contrary to the
wishes of its subjects. However unpalatable their actions, the
paparazzi are an inevitable underside of the legitimate use of
newsgathering to inform the people, a value which is funda-
mental to the republican notion of a public's ability and duty to
govern itself.
-Rebecca Roiphe
36See, e.g., Robert Welkos, Two Photographers Sentenced to Jail, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
24, 1998, at B3.
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